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HIGH CRIMES, NOT MISDEMEANORS:
DETERRING THE PRODUCTION OF
UNSAFE FOOD
Rena Steinzorl
"Enron is indicative of nothing . . . There's always people
who do something they shouldn't and you'll never be able to
legislate against it. This stuff happens."
Alan Greenberg, Chairman, Executive Committee, Bear Stearns'
"FDA regulates food manufacturers' safety practices by rely-
ing on companies' self-interest in producing safe products,
and by working with the industry to improve production prac-
tices."
Geoffrey Becker, Congressional Research Service2
The FDA needs the ability to criminally prosecute quickly
and effectively when needed. If someone is convicted of a fe-
lony in the criminal justice system, they go to prison and are
not allowed to vote. But, if you poison Americans via their
food supply what are the consequences? You pay a fine and
keep producing? Is this right? Is this what we as Americans
want?
Peter Hurley, police officer, Portland, Oregon and father of sur-
viving salmonella-poisoned child.3
t Rena Steinzor is a professor at the University of Maryland School of Law
and the president of the Center for Progressive Reform, www.progressivereform.org.
She appreciates the energetic research assistance provided by Ryan Sweigard, James
Getz, and Limor Weizman, as well as the expert editing provided by research libra-
rian Susan McCarty.
1 Steven Pearlstein, Debating the Enron Effect: Business World Divided on
Problem and Solutions, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2002, at Al.
2 GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL FOOD
SAFETY SYSTEM: A PRIMER 2 (2009), available at http://www.national
aglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22600.pdf [hereinafter CRS PRIMER].
3 Mr. Hurley is the father of Lauren, 5, Jacob, 3, and Alyssa, 8 months.
Jacob was sickened by Austin peanut butter crackers in January 2009, but survived.
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OVERVIEW
In the fall of 2008, Minnesota public health officials became
alarmed by an unusually high number of illnesses and deaths caused
by salmonella poisoning. Using the tedious and time-consuming "tra-
ceback process," which involves interviewing victims in detail about
their eating habits to discover common foods,4 graduate students em-
ployed by the state part-time and jokingly referred to as the "Diarrhea
Squad," eventually determined that the victims had all consumed pea-
nut products that were supplied to schools, nursing homes, and other
institutions by the Peanut Corporation of America ("PCA").
PCA had two processing plants: one in Blakely, Georgia and a
second in Plainview, Texas. While the mainstream media demanded
details about the outbreak, which ultimately killed nine and sickened
660, federal, state, and congressional investigators swarmed to PCA's
facilities in Blakely, Georgia and Plainview, Texas.5 Within weeks,
both plants closed and the company declared bankruptcy.6 Media
accounts and congressional oversight hearings revealed several shock-
ing facts about the facility and the absence of any effective govern-
ment oversight of its operations:
* Plant operators knowingly shipped peanut products to their
customers after these materials had tested positive for salmo-
nella. In an effort to justify their activities, the plant operators
continued to retest these products until they achieved a nega-
tive result.7
The Salmonella Outbreak: The Continued Failure to Protect the Food Supply: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (testimony of Peter K. Hurley), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090211/testimonyhurley.pdf [herei-
nafter The Salmonella Hearings].
4 For a description of this methodology, see The Salmonella Hearings,
supra note 3, at 2-5 (testimony of Stephen F. Sundlof, Director, Center for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food & Drug Admin.), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090211/testimonysundlof.pdf [he-
reinafter Sundlof Testimony].
Karla Cook, Peanut Recall's Ripples Feel Like a Tidal Wave for Some
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at 86.
6 Andrew Martin, Troubled Peanut Company Files for Bankruptcy Protec-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at B2.
7 The most notorious e-mail exchange, between PCA president Stewart
Parnell and Joe Valenza, the Vice President for Finance and Administration of the
King Nut Companies, reads:
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* The Texas plant operated unlicensed and had not been in-
spected by state officials for nearly four years.8 Testing at the
Texas plant in February 2009 indicated possible salmonella
contamination of the facility, former employees told the New
York Times that the facility was "disgusting," and the compa-
ny ultimately agreed to close the facility voluntarily.9
* The Georgia plant was awash in outright safety violations
and unwise management practices, such as a leaking roof,
mold growing on ceilings and walls, rodent infestation, filthy
nut processing receptacles, and feathers and feces in its air fil-
tration system.10
* Under an agreement with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), Georgia state inspectors visited the PCA plant
nine times in 2006-2008, but state officials took no effective
action to terminate any of these conditions. Inspectors tested
processed peanuts at the facility for salmonella only once, de-
spite widespread news reports at the time regarding a compa-
rable outbreak at a ConAgra plant seventy-five miles away in
Sylvester, Georgia; the test came up negative and the plant
continued to operate.
Parnell to Valenza: "Joe, I'm sure it's something we did."
Valenza to Parnell: "Now my heart is really in my throat. I think I'm going
to church tonight."
This exchange was quoted by Representative Bart Stupak. The Salmonella Out-
break-The Role of Industry in Protecting the Nation's Food Supply: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 111th Cong. 2 (2009), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
Press Il1/20090319/stupak open.pdf [hereinafter Stupak Statement] (opening state-
ment of Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the
H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce); see also Gardiner Harris, Salmonella Was
Found at Peanut Plant Before, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A15 (noting that PCA
shipped foods that retested negative for salmonella twelve times in 2007 and 2008).
8 Gardiner Harris, After Tests, Peanut Plant in Texas Is Closed, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2009, at A14.
9 Id.
10 Stupak Statement, supra note 7, at 3 (requesting that the vivid descriptions
of these conditions, and photographs that document them, be entered into the congres-
sional record); see also Michael Moss, Peanut Case Shows Holes in Food Safety Net,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at Al.
1 The ConAgra outbreak occurred in 2007 and sickened more than 600
people, but no one died. ConAgra's total business dropped twenty percent during the
seven months the peanut butter was off the shelves. Kim Severson, Who's Sticking
with Us?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at DI; see also Moss, supra note 10.
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* Georgia employs sixty field inspectors to cover 16,000 fa-
cilities, ranging from processing plants to food storage ware-
houses. 12
* The Georgia plant had received a "superior" rating from a
private audit firm, American Institute of Baking International
(AIB), barely a year before the outbreak, although a second
auditing team hired by its customer Nestl6 Inc. had turned in
such a damning report that Nestl6 stopping buying products
from PCA. "
* When called to testify before Congress, Stewart Parnell,
PCA's chief executive officer, invoked his Fifth Amendment
right not to incriminate himself.14 The company, and not Mr.
Parnell, ultimately became the target of a criminal investiga-
tion.
* The outbreak resulted in the recall of some 2100 products
containing PCA peanuts. It cost the peanut industry $1 billion
and uncounted hundreds of millions more were spent by its
customers, large and small manufacturers of everything from
cereal to health store granola bars. 16
Outbreaks of food-borne illness cause 5,000 deaths, hospitalize
325,000 Americans, and make 76 million people sick annually, ac-
cording to a 1999 estimate by the Centers for Disease Control.17 The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) puts these numbers consi-
derably higher, estimating in 1996 that food-borne illness kills 9,100
people and makes 81 million people sick.18
12 The Salmonella Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (testimony of Oscar S. Garri-
son, Assistant Commissioner, Consumer Protection Division, Georgia Department of
Agriculture), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090211/
testimonygarrison.pdf.
13 Andrew Martin, Peanut Plant Says Audits Declared It in Top Shape, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at B310; Lyndsey Layton, Nestle's Inspectors Saw Rat Drop-
pings, Rejected Peanuts, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2009, at A2.
14 Gardiner Harris, Peanut Foods Shipped Before Testing Came In, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at A24.
15 See Rob Stein, FDA Investigating Peanut Company Behind Recall: Firm
Could Face Criminal Charges, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2009, at A2. Corporations
targeted for criminal prosecution are not jailed, of course, but are liable for fines.
16 Emily Fredrix, Salmonella Recall Could Cost Peanut Producers $1 Bil-
lion, INs. J., Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/
national/2009/03/12/98635.htm.
17 These widely cited figures are from a 1999 report by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control. See Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United
States, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 607, 607 (1999).
18 RES., CMTY., & ECON. DEv. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING REP. No.
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The 2009 peanut scandal propelled Congress to put food safety to
the top of its legislative agenda; the House of Representatives passed
legislation in July 2009, and Senate leaders have pledged to follow
suit.19 The bills would dramatically expand the FDA's regulatory
authority and increase agency funding for the implementation of these
stringent new authorities. Both pieces of legislation strengthen the
penalties available for violations of their new provisions. However, in
one of the most perplexing instances of legislative under-reaction to a
public health crisis in recent memory, the Senate bill does not streng-
then the existing criminal penalties available for such violations. Un-
der existing law as left intact by the Senate bill, even the egregious
conduct of PCA owner Stewart Pamell would be punishable as a mis-
demeanor, with a maximum penalty of not more than one year in jail
and a $1,000 fine.20 In contrast, the legislation passed by the House
would raise this penalty to a felony for comparable future acts, pu-
nishable by up to ten years in jail21 and a fine determined under the
provisions of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Those provisions cap indi-
vidual assessments at $250,000 and corporate assessments at
$500,000 unless the pecuniary benefit to the defendant is greater than
those amounts, in which case the person can be compelled to pay
twice the gross amount of the gain. 22
At a time when regulatory agencies are being asked to do much
more with less, why have Senate lawmakers neglected the relatively
inexpensive and effective approach of authorizing criminal liability
for the worst violators? What concerns, legitimate and bogus, block
the return to deterrence-based enforcement of stringent, proscriptive
regulation? This article makes a start on answering those questions,
which have implications beyond food safety. I contend that Senate
legislators' decision to leave blatant violations of food safety law pu-
nishable as a mere misdemeanor reflects a counterproductive ambiva-
lence regarding the prosecution of white collar crime. During an era
when victims defrauded by the largest Wall Street Ponzi scheme in
history were marching in the streets to ensure that Bernard Madoff
GAO/RCED-96-96, FOOD SAFETY: INFORMATION ON FOODBORNE ILLNESSES 4 (1996),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/I996/rc96096.pdf.
19 Gardiner Harris, Bipartisan Group Demands Overhaul on Food Safety,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at A20.
20 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2006).
Repeat violators are liable for up to three years in jail and a $10,000 fine. § 333(a)(2).
21 Food Safety Enhancement Act, H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. § 134 (2009).
22 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006).
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would never emerge from jail, this attitude is as baffling as it is re-
mote from public sentiment.23
The article opens with a brief diagnosis of why the existing food
safety system is dysfunctional. It explores the fundamental theories
behind deterrence-based enforcement and rebuts the arguments ad-
vanced by conservative economists against those theories in a white
collar context. It concludes with a proposal for enhancing the penalty
provisions in pending legislation while providing a defense for corpo-
rate actors who exercise due diligence in complying with strengthened
regulations.
Congress should embrace stringent criminal liability provisions
because misconduct in certain areas of food production has mortal
consequences for consumers. Globalization of the economy, which
has produced a surging market for imported foods, means that federal
and state regulators will never succeed if their sole focus is inspecting
their way out of trouble. Rather, Congress must create harshly nega-
tive incentives for larger food processors through the imposition of
strict criminal liability for both deliberate and negligent malfeasance
within the supply chain. Expansive criminal liability for individuals
and corporations should become a weapon of first resort because
small numbers of well-publicized prosecutions have tremendous po-
tential to create and maintain those incentives.
Although problems with the Department of Agriculture's food
safety programs, which govern the production of meat, poultry, and
eggs, are very important, and have direct implications for the FDA's
failures, they are beyond the scope of this discussion. The details of
the FDA's regulatory programs, now and under the pending legisla-
tion, are also given short shrift in order to keep a tight focus on the
utility of criminal prosecution in situations similar to the peanut scan-
dal described in the opening pages of this piece.
I. REGULATORY DYSFUNCTION AT THE FDA
The U.S. population spends "more than $1 trillion on food each
year, nearly half of it in restaurants, schools, and other places outside
the home."24 An estimated fifteen percent of the food Americans eat
23 See Kevin McCoy, Victims' Anger Shifts Past Madoff Criticism Turns to
Role SEC and Others May Have Played and How They'll Be Repaid, USA TODAY,
June 30, 2009, at lB. Bernard Madoff is a former Wall Street trader and investor who
ran what is estimated to be the largest Ponzi scheme in history, ultimately defrauding
his customers of billions of dollars.
24 CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 1; see also EcON. RESEARCH SERv., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD SECTOR 335 (2009), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Browse/
FoodSector/ (explaining that roughly two-thirds of this amount pays for domestically
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is imported, much of it from countries without any effective food safe-
ty regulation.25 The FDA is responsible for regulating eighty percent
of that food; 2 6 everything other than meat and poultry fall within its
jurisdiction, although other agencies share responsibility for eggs,
fish, and pesticide residues on produce. 27 The FDA has jurisdiction
over more than 44,000 U.S. food manufacturers, as well as over
100,000 additional registered food facilities including warehouses and
28grain elevators. Some 200,000 foreign food facilities have filed
FDA registrations, but given the highly decentralized structure of food
production and processing in developing countries like China, it is
difficult to imagine that this figure comes close to an accurate esti-
mate of the number of places where imported food originates.29
As is the case with other health and safety agencies, FDA food
safety programs are undermined by three severe problems: (1) acute
funding shortages, (2) outdated statutory authority, and (3) the enorm-
ous challenges posed by imported food. These crippling conditions
are well-documented in a series of reports by the National Academies'
Institute of Medicine,30 the FDA's own independent science advisory
board, the Congressional Research Service (CRS),32 the Government
produced farm foods; imports and seafood account for the remainder).
25 GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS: SAFEGUARDS AND SELECTED ISSUES 3 (Apr. 2009), available
at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL34198.pdf [hereinafter CRS
SELECTED ISSUES].
26 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-02-47T, FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGES NEEDED TO ENSURE SAFE FOOD 2 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0247t.pdf.
27 For a succinct summary of FDA jurisdiction, see CRS PRIMER, supra note
2.
28 id
29 Id. For an insightful discussion of China's food industry, see GEOFFREY S.
BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS FROM CHINA
(2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34080.pdf [hereinafter CRS CHINESE
IMPORTS].
30 See COMM. To ENSURE SAFE FOOD FROM PROD. TO CONSUMPTION, INST. OF
MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD FROM PRODUCTION TO
CONSUMPTION (1998).
31 See Sci. BD., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK:
REPORT OF THE FDA SCIENCE BOARD'S SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press 110/022508.Science
BoardReport.EstimatedResources.pdf.
32 See CRS PRIMER, supra note 2; see GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., FOOD SAFETY ON THE FARM: FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND SELECTED
PROPOSALS (2009), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/
RL34612.pdf, CRS SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 25; CRS CHINESE IMPORTS, supra
note 29; GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SANITARY AND
PHYTOSANITARY (SPS) CONCERNS IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE (2006), available at
2010] 18 1
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Accountability Office (GAO),33 former FDA officials who are now in
academia, 34 public interest groups,3 5 as well as a self-analysis written
by FDA staff during President George W. Bush's administration.
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Jul/RL33472.pdf.
3 The following list is not all-inclusive of GAO reports on food safety, but
rather singles out those most relevant to the FDA's contribution to this mission: U.S.
GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-09-523, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
FDA NEEDS TO ESTABLISH KEY PLANS AND PROCESSES FOR GUIDING SYSTEMS
MODERNIZATION EFFORTS (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09523.pdf (explaining problems with the agency's computerized data analysis sys-
tems); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-08-435T, FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY: FDA's FOOD PROTECTION PLAN PROPOSES POSITIVE
FIRST STEPS, BUT CAPACITY TO CARRY THEM OUT Is CRITICAL (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08435t.pdf [hereinafter GAO FDA CAPACITY] (ex-
plaining that the FDA must have more money, legal authority, and political will to
implement the Bush Administration proposed plan for improving its food safety pro-
grams); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-08-909T, FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY: FDA HAS PROVIDED FEW DETAILS ON THE RESOURCES
AND STRATEGIES NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT ITS FOOD PROTECTION PLAN (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08909t.pdf (criticizing the FDA for failing to
report in sufficient detail on its progress in implementing the Bush Plan); U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-08-794, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED
COUNTRIES' SYSTEMS CAN OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND
RESPONDING TO FOODBORNE ILLNESS (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08794.pdf (highlighting efforts in Europe and Canada to implement more
effective food safety systems); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No.
GAO-05-549T, OVERSEEING THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO
REDUCE OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05549t.pdf [hereinafter GAO SIMPLIFICATION] (urg-
ing the consolidation and simplification of the nation's food safety laws and the ad-
ministrative structure employed to implement them); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-05-51, FOOD SAFETY: USDA AND FDA NEED TO BETTER
ENSURE PROMPT AND COMPLETE RECALLS OF POTENTIALLY UNSAFE FOOD (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0551.pdf [hereinafter GAO RECALLS]
(concluding the recalls are always voluntary and poorly supervised, with the result
that many are ineffective in removing contaminated food from homes); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-04-246, FOOD SAFETY: FDA's IMPORTED
SEAFOOD SAFETY PROGRAM SHOWS SOME PROGRESS, BUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS
ARE NEEDED (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04246.pdf (ex-
plaining the problems that undermine efforts to supervise the safety of imported fish),
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GAO/RCED-98-103, FOOD SAFETY:
FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF IMPORTED FOODS ARE INCONSISTENT
AND UNRELIABLE (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98103.pdf
[hereinafter GAO FOOD IMPORTS] (exploring the difficulties the FDA has had as a
result of a small inspection force, increasing imports, and the difficulty of verifying
that other countries effectively assure safety of their exports).
34 See MICHAEL R. TAYLOR & STEPHANIE D. DAVID, STRONGER
PARTNERSHIPS FOR SAFER FOOD: AN AGENDA FOR STRENGTHENING STATE AND LOCAL
ROLES IN THE NATION'S FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM (2009), available at http://www.rwjf
.org/files/research/20090417foodsafetyfinalreport.pdf, TOWARD SAFER FOOD.
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In 2007, the GAO decided to include federal government over-
sight of food safety on its "high-risk series" list.3 7 The high-risk list
was initiated in 1990 as a tool for identifying government programs in
need of urgent reform, either because they are subject to significant
waste and fraud or because they need "broad-based transformation to
address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges." To
keep the implications of inclusion on the list appropriately dire, the
GAO has targeted a limited number of programs in what it obviously
considers to be in deep trouble; only thirty appeared on the list as of
January 2009. The list includes areas of well-publicized and wide-
spread concern, such as effective management of the Department of
Homeland Security, which was listed in 2003, shortly after Congress
created this huge, new entity. It also includes programs that only pe-
riodically come to the public's attention, such as the National Flood
Insurance Program, which was listed in 2006, as the implications of
Hurricane Katrina for coastal property damage were becoming clear.
The GAO's impeccable reputation for objectivity and freedom from
political interference should catapult "high-risk" programs to the top
of the executive and legislative branches' priorities for reform, spur-
ring improvements that convince GAO to de-list the program. Unfor-
tunately, reforms are not always forthcoming and several particularly
intractable problems - for example, supply and weapons acquisition at
the Department of Defense - have remained on the list since its incep-
tion in 1990.
The GAO was characteristically blunt in explaining its reason for
listing food safety as a high priority risk:
[GAO added food safety in 2007] because 15 agencies collec-
tively administer 30 food-related laws. Since then, the largest
food-borne outbreak in the last 10 years was linked to Salmo-
nella in fresh produce. Also, high levels of imported foods
PERSPECTIVES ON RISK AND PRIORITY SETTING (Sandra A. Hoffmann & Michael R.
Taylor eds., 2005).
3 TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, KEEPING AMERICA'S FOOD SAFE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR FIXING THE FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2009), available at http://healthyamericans.org/
assets/files/2009FoodSafetyReport.pdf (the FDA is housed at the department).
36 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IMPORT SAFETY, DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., ACTION PLAN FOR IMPORT SAFETY (2007), available at
http://www.importsafety.gov/report/actionplan.pdf.
37 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-09-271, HIGH-RISK
SERIES: AN UPDATE 5 tbl.3 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09271.pdf [hereinafter GAO HIGH RISK].
38 Id. at 33.
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underscore the urgency to revamp this system. About 15 per-
cent of the overall U.S. food supply is imported, as is about
60 percent of fresh fruits and vegetables and over 80 percent
of seafood.
... Federal expenditures on food safety are not based on the
volume of foods regulated by the agencies or consumed by
the public. FDA is responsible for about 80 percent of the
food supply and yet accounts for about 24 percent of expendi-
tures.39
The FDA fields approximately 1,900 inspectors in regional offices
throughout the United States, and has a staff of some 900 at its Wash-
ington D.C. headquarters. 40 As indicated by the PCA peanut saga,
state and local agencies also inspect food production facilities, al-
though the quality of the inspection and enforcement programs are
often sub-par.41 Information on the frequency of FDA inspections is
somewhat inconsistent. The CRS reports that "various estimates of
unannounced compliance inspections of domestic establishments by
FDA officials range from once every five years to once every ten
years, on average, although the agency claims to visit about 6,000 so-
called high-risk facilities on an annual basis."42 The GAO's analysis
of FDA data showed that inspections of some 190,000 foreign food
firms decreased from 211 in fiscal year 2001 to fewer than 100 in
fiscal year 2007.43
In fiscal year ("FY") 2009, the FDA's budget for monitoring the
safety of eighty percent of the nation's food supply was $649 million,
plus another $137 million for the regulation of animal drugs and
feeds." In dramatic contrast, the Department of Agriculture's budget
for monitoring the safety of twenty percent of the nation's food supply
was $972 million 45 President Obama's budget for FY 2010 would add
' Id. at 7 1.
40 CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 2.
41 See Gardiner Harris, III from Food? Investigations Vary by State, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, at Al.
42 GAO FDA CAPACITY, supra note 33 at 6.
43 GAO FOOD IMPORTS, supra note 33, at 5.
4 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PROTECTING AMERICA'S FOOD SUPPLY: INVESTMENTS FOR SUPPLY CHAIN SAFETY
AND SECURITY 9, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDAIReportsManualsForms/
Reports/BudgetReports/UCM I 53494.pdf.
45 JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AGRICULTURE AND RELATED
AGENCIES: FY 2010 APPROPRIATIONS 28 (2009), http://www.nasda.org/File.aspx?id
=24557.
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$259 million to the FDA budget. If Congress approves the reforms to
the FDA's legal authority contained in pending legislation, this influx
of funding will strengthen the FDA's ability to promulgate new rules
and significantly increase staffing at headquarters, which should grow
to 854 Full-time Equivalents, or FTEs, while regional offices would
field 2,165 inspectors.4 6 These increases would allow the FDA to
inspect high-priority domestic facilities more frequently, but they are
unlikely to make much of a dent in the agency's limited ability to su-
pervise foreign imports.
The FDA does not have existing authority to order recalls. In-
stead the FDA must rely on the cooperation of food manufacturers,
processors, wholesalers, and retailers to accomplish the arduous and
expensive job of extracting contaminated food from commerce. In-
deed, the agency's legal impotence was noted by press covering the
peanut scandal.47  Consumer groups and independent experts have
sharply criticized the FDA's lack of mandatory recall authority, and
pending House and Senate reauthorization legislation would give the
* * 48agency this authority.
Some prominent members of the food industry and FDA career
staff have argued that mandatory recall authority could interfere with
the cooperative spirit that supposedly pervades industry and govern-
ment collaboration during voluntary recalls, an ingredient they say is
essential to the efficacy of the recall remedy, and would therefore
make the FDA a less valuable partner in corporate efforts to encour-
age consumers to turn in tainted food.49 Congress has thus far decided
to ignore these arguments. Among other considerations, this rationale
does not take into account the short-term economic pressures - and
even sheer laziness or malfeasance - that can provoke food producers
to cut corners, all of which were on full display in the PCA peanut
incident. Kellogg, a major customer of PCA, clearly understood the
implications for its business if peanut paste was contaminated by sal-
monella, and the company made an effort to forestall this kind of
46 For the granular detail of how the FDA would spend these amounts,
see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FY 2010 EXHIBIT FOR CONGRESSIONAL
APPROPRIATORS, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Reports
ManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM I 53496.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
47 Gardiner Harris, Peanut Product Recall Took Company Approval, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at A13.
48 Food Safety Enhancement Act, H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. § I11 (2009);
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. § 206 (2009).
49 See VANESSA K. BuRROwS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FDA's
AUTHORITY TO RECALL PRODUCTS 3 (2007), available at http://www.national
aglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL3 4 167.pdf.
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problem by deploying third-party inspectors to PCA's Georgia plant.5 0
However, the inspector, who was paid by PCA and not Kellogg, was
not only incompetent but overly friendly with the target of his efforts,
sending a note by electronic mail announcing cheerfully, "You lucky
guy. I am your AIB auditor. So we need to get your plant set up for
any audit.... Thanks and Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to
you and your family."5 1 The inspector subsequently cleared the dates
of the audit with plant personnel.52
In any event, the unfortunate reality is that even in the best of cir-
cumstances, recalls are notoriously difficult to implement and are not
an effective substitute for preventive regulation. Because products are
relatively inexpensive and purchases are so numerous, retailers rarely
have easy access to the names and contact information of individual
customers. Even if such information is available, recalls involving
millions of units are daunting to implement. The GAO reported in
2004 that "most recalled food is not recovered," estimating that food
recalls supervised by the FDA in 2003 recovered thirty-six percent of
covered products.53
Of course, the fact that consumers do not take the trouble to return
products does not mean that contaminated food is consumed. During
the 2009 peanut scare, the FDA web site disseminating information
regarding affected products was visited twenty-eight million times.5 4
These figures indicate that national press attention motivates extensive
public interest and suggest that, rather than returning contaminated
food items, many consumers simply toss them in the trash. If these
assumptions are correct, the real threats to public health lie in food
consumed before researchers trace back the contamination and the
multiple instances of small-scale contamination that do not receive
intensive national coverage.
As a result of the growing threats to public health and steep costs
to the food industry, the full spectrum of participants in the food safe-
ty debate agree that FDA regulators must emphasize programs that
prevent outbreaks of contamination through the mandatory implemen-
tation of "food safety plans" that assess the risks posed by the
processing that occurs at covered facilities. The House and Senate
50 See supra text accompanying note 13.
5' E-mail from Pete Hatfield, Inspector, Am. Inst. of Banking, Inc., to
Sammy Lightsey, Plant Manager, Peanut Corp. of Am. (Dec. 22, 2008, 10:55:08),
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090319/Email%20
exchange%20Hatfield%2OLightsey%20December%2031 %202008.pdf.
52 id.
53 GAO RECALLS, supra note 33.
54 See Sundlof Testimony, supra note 4, at 9.
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bills both have provisions requiring owners, operators, or agents of
covered facilities to prepare such plans under guidance issued by the
FDA and to update the plans periodically." To ensure that the FDA
has a credible presence in policing compliance with these plans, the
bills take the unusual step of mandating how often covered facilities
must be inspected. The House-passed legislation is more specific
requiring that the FDA rank facilities as "Category 1/high-risk," "Cat-
egory 2/low-risk," or as a "Category 3/facility that holds food.", 6 The
House directs the FDA to randomly inspect Category 1 facilities at
least every six to twelve months, Category 2 facilities at least every
eighteen months to three years, and Category 3 facilities at least every
five years. In contrast, the Senate would require inspection of "high-
risk" facilities every two years during the first two years after the date
of enactment, and every year following that initial period, while "non-
high-risk" facilities must be inspected at least once every four years.57
These mandatory timetables are an important reform for an agen-
cy that exhibits such acute dysfunction. But if Congress does not de-
liver the funding necessary to meet these aggressive schedules, the
provisions will degenerate into symbolic law. The bills do not contain
so-called "citizen suit" provisions that would allow concerned parties
to take the agency to court if it does not meet the new statutory dead-
lines. These citizen suit provisions are common in the federal envi-
ronmental laws," and court orders have played an important role in
pressuring the Environmental Protection Agency to ask Congress for
the funds needed to implement statutory mandates.
As for imports, neither bill would adopt the most aggressive
reform proposed by the GAO and other independent observers. 5 9 Be-
fore meat and poultry are imported to this country, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture must conduct an evaluation determining that the
source country has a regulatory system in place that is basically
equivalent to the system we have in the United States.60  This so-
s5 Food Safety Enhancement Act, H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. § 101 (registra-
tion); H.R. 2749 § 102 (hazard analysis and risk-based preventive controls) (2009);
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. § 102 (2009) (relating to
registration of food facilities); § 103 (hazard analysis and risk-based preventive con-
trols).
1 H.R. 2749, § 105 (2009).
1 S. 510 § 201 (relating to the targeting of inspection resources for domestic
facilities, foreign facilities, and ports of entry).
58 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006) (authorizing citizen suits for violations
of the Clean Water Act).
5 See, e.g., GAO FOOD IMPORTS, supra note 33, at 21-26.
6o See generally OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
FOOD SAFETY INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, PROCESS FOR
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called "equivalency authority" allows American regulators to "trans-
fer the primary food safety responsibility to the exporting country," in
effect leveraging their own resources by evaluating programs periodi-
cally rather than posting hundreds, even thousands, of inspectors at
U.S. ports.6' As Senate leaders began their consideration of food safe-
ty legislation in January 2009, they apparently concluded that they
could not muster enough political support to overcome strenuous food
industry resistance to such a system and that the money needed to
implement it would not be forthcoming. The legislation adopts com-
promises on imports that are likely to prove far less effective. The
House-passed bill authorizes the FDA to require "certification" of
food imports if the FDA decides, in its discretion, that the process
would assist the agency in deciding whether to admit a potentially
risky category of food.62 Certifications could be performed by "quali-
fied certifying entities," an opaque term that can include regulators
from other countries' governments or accredited third-party inspectors
recognized by the FDA. 63 Given the remarkably incompetent perfor-
mance of national third party inspectors during the PCA peanut scan-
dal and shortcomings of regulatory programs in China and other Asian
countries that have become the leading sources of such high-hazard
commodities as fish, neither alternative is likely to provide satisfacto-
ry protection for quite some time.
The leading Senate legislation is even weaker. It places the bur-
den on importers to "perform risk-based foreign supplier verification
activities in accordance with regulations promulgated [by the
FDA]."6 An importer who violates these requirements commits a
"prohibited act" under the Senate bill but is liable only for the misde-
meanor penalty available under existing law.65
EVALUATING THE EQUIVALENCE OF FOREIGN MEAT AND POULTRY FOOD REGULATORY
SYSTEMS (2003), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/IPS/EQ/EQProcess
.pdf (detailing the legal authority requiring and process for performing equivalency
evaluations).
61 GAO FOOD IMPORTS, supra note 33, at 24.
62 H.R. 2749 § 109 (2009).
63 Id,
6 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. § 301 (2009)
(relating to foreign supplier verification program).
65 Id.; Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
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II. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AS ANTIDOTE TO
DYSFUNCTION
A. The "E(nforcement) Word"
The FDA's regulatory dysfunction is the product of two powerful
and converging trends. The first trend is a highly successful campaign
to discredit federal regulatory intervention in the so-called "free"
market.66  This campaign, mounted by the nation's most powerful
business interests, began with the election of President Ronald Reagan
and peaked during the administration of George W. Bush ("Bush II").
During the entire Bush II period, health and safety laws were left to
molder without updating amendments; 6 7 the White House stifled regu-
latory proposals that had been in the pipeline for years, including
those prompted by non-discretionary statutory mandates;68 and budg-
ets were slashed with the full cooperation of agency political appoin-
tees.69
The dynamics that advanced the campaign to deregulate changed
with the 2008 presidential election. At present, proponents are wag-
ing a ferocious battle to maintain their influence in the wake of the
Enron, WorldCom, and Madoff scandals, acute public distress over
the global economic recession that began in 2008, conspicuous holes
in the regulatory safety net that are manifested as salmonella-laced
66 This word is placed in quotation marks because the economic dynamics of
the American and global marketplaces are heavily influenced by government subsi-
dies, tax loopholes, and financial regulation, making the free market described by
economists and advocates of deregulation a theoretical construct that has little rela-
tionship with reality.
67 The food safety provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act were last
amended in 1997. See Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, §§ 301-309, 111 Stat. 2296, 2350-56. Other laws in
desperate need of change include the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006), last amended in 1998, by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration Compliance Assistance Authorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-197, 112 Stat. 638, and the Clean Water Act, last amended in 1987, by the Feder-
al Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, §§ 301-306,
101 Stat. 29-37.
68 For example, the Bush II Administration decided to postpone strong regu-
lation of mercury emissions from power plants until 2018. Beth Daley, EPA Rule
Will Limit Power-Plant Mercury, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2005, at Al.
69 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Safety Chief Is Opposing More Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at Cl (describing a request by Nancy Nord, chair of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, that Congress abandon plans to increase her agen-
cy's budget).
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peanut butter and lead-coated imported toys, 70 and the election of
President Obama, who defines government's role as doing for people
what "we cannot do for ourselves."7 The president has lent his strong
support to food safety reform, in particular with respect to the FDA.72
These events and the president's attitudes have clearly slowed the
advance of deregulation, although the movement remains quite active
in areas like the debate over climate change legislation.
The second converging trend is a Congress' systematic under-
funding of regulatory agencies by Congress. These budget gaps make
the agencies far more susceptible to assertions that they must tread
softly in controlling business practices because they lack the resources
they need to defend their rules against strong attack, both during the
rulemaking process and in court. As serious, shortfalls deprive the
agencies of the resources they need to make their enforcement pro-
grams appear even minimally credible, as illustrated by the statistics
regarding the FDA's ability to inspect food processing facilities cited
earlier.73 Eventually, this noxious combination of demoralized and
underfunded bureaucracy hurts businesses as well as consumers; con-
sider the $1 billion in losses the peanut industry suffered as a result of
the caused by the PCA peanut scandal just among other producers of
peanut products.74
Despite the obvious damage legitimate businesses suffer as a re-
sult of regulatory dysfunction, corporate executives rarely embrace
affirmative reforms. Food safety is a modest, partial exception to this
general rule, at least up to a point. Sensing a turning tide of political
support, major trade associations have testified before Congress in
support of legislation that would expand FDA food safety programs.
But the most prominent have drawn the line at strengthened penalties
and enforcement. Consider the following statement from Cal Dooley,
former president and chief executive officer of the Grocery Manufac-
turers Association (GMA), which is among the most prominent indus-
try groups participating in the debate:
70 See, e.g., Louise Story, Lead Paint Prompts Mattel to Recall 967,000
Toys, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at Cl (describing recalls of toys coated with lead
paint and imported from China).
71 Barack Obama, U.S. Senator, Closing Argument Speech at the Canton
Memorial Civic Center (Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/
2008/10/obama closingargument speech_1.html.
72 Gardiner Harris, President Plans Team to Overhaul Food Safety, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A24.
73 See CRS PRIMER, supra note 2, at 2; GAO FOOD IMPORTS, supra note 34.
74 Fredrix, supra note 16 (describing a cost estimate by Don Koehler, of the
Georgia Peanut Commission, of the costs imposed on rural peanut producers by the
PCA scandal).
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We also strongly oppose costly new regulatory requirements,
including provisions that provide FDA inspectors with broad
authority to review the adequacy of food safety plans . . . .
While we support the requirement that all food companies
have a food safety plan, we believe food companies should
be given the discretion to identify appropriate safety controls
... . Prescriptive, across-the-board, new regulatory require-
ments will stifle innovation, divert resources from proven
food safety measures, and will increase food costs at a time of
record food inflation.
While we believe that some facilities deserve greater scrutiny
than others, we opposed rigid inspection schedules and in-
stead believe that FDA inspections should be based upon risk.
We also strongly opposed needless civil penalties and reins-
pection fees. Food companies have powerful incentives to en-
sure the safety of food products and ingredients and current
law already provides a wide range of enforcement tools, in-
cluding seizure, injunction, and civil and criminal penalties.
Giving FDA the power to assign massive fines and fees will
dramatically alter the cooperative relationship between FDA
and the food industry and will create a powerful incentive for
FDA to find violations regardless of merit.75
Dooley's demand for a "cooperative" relationship with govern-
ment coincides with what has happened to enforcement over the
course of the deregulatory campaign, when conservatives argued that
the country would be better served if government committed re-
sources to "compliance assistance," a term of art for government pro-
grams that seek to educate regulated industries about the elaborate
regulatory requirements that apply to their operations.76 Under Presi-
dents William Clinton and George H.W. and George W. Bush, such
programs flourished, although efforts to assess their effectiveness are
virtually impossible because no one kept reliable statistics regarding
either the number of businesses involved in compliance counseling or
the impact of such educational efforts on the incidence of noncom-
7 FDA Overhaul: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2008) (statement of Cal Dooly,
President & CEO, Grocery Mfg. Ass'n) (emphasis added).
76 See, e.g., Mark Wilson, Save Lives by Cutting Red Tape: Redefine the
Federal Role in Workplace Safety and Health (Sept. 5, 1995), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/socialsecurity/upload/897401 .pdf (arguing that the
OSHA should work cooperatively with businesses, for example, by making com-
pliance assistance a central component of its programs).
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pliance among those companies.77 The arguments made by Bush II
appointees and food industry representatives to the effect that the
FDA should not receive mandatory recall authority and instead should
continue to rely on voluntary cooperation by companies that produced
tainted food are direct descendants of this compliance counseling ap-
proach.78
The question remains whether Senator Durbin's (D-Ill.) decision
to omit any changes to the FDA's authority to impose criminal penal-
ties for food safety violations is also based on these considerations.
Senator Durbin introduced S. 510 on March 3, 2009, with ten co-
sponsors - five Democrats and five Republicans. The Democrats
included Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), Roland Burris (D-
Ill.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Edward Kennedy (D-Mass., since
deceased), and Tom Udall (D-Utah). The Republicans included Sena-
tors Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.), Richard Burr (R-N.C.), Saxby
Chambliss (R-S.C.), Judd Gregg (R-N.H.), and Johnny Isakson (R-
Ga.). With the possible exception of Senator Gregg, the Republicans
in this group are pointedly conservative and generally support busi-
ness interests, justifying the speculation that Senator Durbin shaped
the content of his bill in order to achieve a bipartisan approach that
would speed the legislation's passage. Omitting stronger criminal
penalty provisions would serve as a logical trade-off in any logrolling
along these lines that may have occurred behind the scenes. The in-
clusion of amendments strengthening criminal liability in parallel
House legislation, and the prominence of a series of food safety scan-
dals during the period when Senator Durbin was drafting S. 510, make
it highly unlikely that the decision to omit these reforms was anything
but a conscious political choice.
B. Responsible Corporate Officers
Following the hypothesis that leaving enhanced criminal penalties
out of the legislation was accomplished by industry lobbying, what
motivates those attitudes? After all, the observation that the misde-
meanor punishment is an ineffective deterrent would logically suggest
that business executives have little to fear from enforcement of these
provisions. Not only are any eventual penalties light, but federal
prosecutors are highly unlikely to spend scarce resources on cases that
do not bring felony convictions.
7 See, e.g., CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REINVENTING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND EPA's WATER PROGRAMS (1996), availa-
ble at http://ncseonline.org/Nle/Crsreports/water/h2o-20.cfm.
78 See BuRROWS, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Industry's antipathy to the FDA's criminal authority undoubtedly
is motivated by two prosecutions of purveyors of tainted food that led
to landmark Supreme Court decisions changing the fundamental pre-
mises of criminal punishment for so-called public welfare offenses.79
The "responsible corporate officer" doctrine that resulted from these
cases holds that executives at the top of a corporate hierarchy, who
were not directly involved in committing violations but were in a po-
sition to implement policies that would have prevented the offensive
conduct, can be held criminally liable to the same extent as their most
culpable underlings.
In a classic 1933 article in the Columbia Law Review, Professor
Francis Bowes Sayre described such cases as the product of an "in-
creasingly complex social order [that] required additional regulation
of an administrative character unrelated to questions of personal
guilt."80  Professor Sayre was scandalized by this development and
warned that such prosecutions should be carefully limited to "public
welfare offenses involving light penalties." 8' Whether a federal pros-
ecution commanding a sentence of up to one year in jail would be
sufficiently light from his perspective is unclear but, in any event, the
Supreme Court did not share his compunction.
The first case involved the prosecution of the Buffalo Pharmacal
Company, Inc., along with its president and general manager Joseph
H. Dotterweich, under the misdemeanor provisions of the Food and
Drug Act for shipping "misbranded drugs" - to wit, "cascara com-
pound" (or "Hinkle Pills") containing strychnine sulfate. 82  The
National Formulary listing of acceptable ingredients for this medica-
tion had excluded that chemical in 1939.83 The specific issue before
the court was whether Dotterweich could be held liable as a "person"
under the Act. Justice Frankfurter's opinion on behalf of five to four
majority declared that the prosecution was based on a:
now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as ef-
fective means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with
7 See id.
80 Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 67
(1933).
" Id. at 83.
82 United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., Inc., 131 F.2d 500, 501-02 (2d
Cir. 1942).
83 The National Formulary is an official publication, issued first by the
American Pharmaceutical Association and now yearly by the United States Pharma-
copeial Convention, that gives the composition, description, method of preparation,
and dosage for drugs. MedicineNet.com, Definition of National Formulary, Dec. 7,
2003, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey-25605.
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the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-
awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person oth-
erwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a pub-
lic danger.84
The 1975 case took this departure from traditional mens rea re-
quirements to its logical conclusion. United States v. Park involved
the poor maintenance of a large Baltimore warehouse used to store
boxed food products by Acme Markets, Inc., a national retail food
chain with 36,000 employees, 874 retail outlets, and 16 warehouses.
The warehouse was plagued by rodents, some of which had managed
to chew through the food packaging in addition to leaving feces and
urine around the facility, and the company had undergone an initial
inspection by FDA officials that lasted for twelve days and produced a
letter to company president John R. Park demanding corrective action.
He delegated responsibility for this work to his Baltimore division
vice president. When FDA representatives returned to re-inspect the
facility four months later, conditions were improved, but rodent infes-
tation persisted and the government decided to prosecute Park crimi-
nally.
Unlike Dotterweich's modest repackaging operation, which
bought drugs wholesale and shipped them to retailers with its own
label, Acme's operations were large and sprawling. Park defended
himself on the basis that he was not directly responsible for sanitary
conditions at the company's storage facilities and that he had dele-
gated these tasks to responsible subordinates. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed his conviction by a jury85 and the gov-
ernment appealed to the Supreme Court. Alarmed by the implications
of the Court's decision to grant certiorari, a broad coalition of indus-
try groups filed amici briefs.
The central issue in the case was whether the trial court judge had
erred in failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution must shoulder
the burden of proving Park guilty of "wrongful action," a term that
implies affirmative behavior.86 Writing on behalf of a six to three
majority, Justice Burger cited substantial precedent concluding that
"knowledge or intent were not required to be proved" and that "an
omission or failure to act" is a sufficient basis for imposing "a respon-
8 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (emphasis
added).
85 United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658
(1975).
86 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 675 (1975).
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sible corporate agent's liability."87 "It was enough in such cases that,
by virtue of the relationship [Park] bore to the corporation, [Park as
an] agent had the power to prevent the act complained of."88
Regardless of the harshness of the penalties at stake in any given
prosecution, the power of the Park and Dotterweich holdings cannot
help but leave every well-informed executive experiencing a combina-
tion of resentment and anxiety. In large corporations, the distance
between plant or warehouse supervisors is great, from bureaucratic
and geographical perspectives. Any lawyer who has counseled clients
who belong to the managerial pool in such organizations and are re-
sponsible for compliance with complex health and safety regulations -
and the author spent seven years engaged in that activity - knows that
the mere initiation of a criminal investigation is considered disastrous,
no matter what its outcome. Unlike borderline financial practices -
and perceptions in that arena are also evolving rapidly - managers
cannot defend themselves by arguing that competitors were engaged
in the same activities. Rather, they find themselves accused of a
crime that threatens people's health, spreading an ethical stain that is
difficult to escape once the mere fact of the accusation becomes
known, even if the knowledge is confined within the corporation.
Two questions remain, however: (1) is anxiety about potentially
unfair prosecution based in reality and, as important; (2) should these
objections be ignored by policy-makers intent on revamping the food
safety system in the United States?
C. Monster in the Closet?
Viewed from the perspective of the FDA's actual track record on
enforcement, anxiety about prosecution as a responsible corporate
officer is analogous to children's fear of the monster in the closet. No
doubt the terror is real, and no doubt the closet is empty.
Under the 2008 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, viola-
tions of section 331 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are charac-
terized as a "Base Offense Level 6," meaning that a conviction would
trigger a sentence of between zero and six months in jail before the
"criminal history points" of the individual defendant are considered.
Even after those points are added, however, sentencing guidance does
not change; the person with the worst history would still be exposed
under the guidance to a zero to six month sentence. According to the
" Id. at 670-71.
88 Id. at 671.
89 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2N2. 1(a) (2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2008guid/CHAP2_L-X.pdf.
1952010]
Federal Justice Statistics kept by the U.S. Department of Justice,
eighty-nine percent of defendants were charged with felony offenses
in FY 2006 (the last year for which such information is available). 90
In order of priority, thirty-eight percent were charged with a "public-
order offense," including twenty percent for immigration violations
and eleven percent for weapons violations, and thirty-seven percent
were charged with a drug offense.9 '
Of course, the Department of Justice cannot prosecute if it does
not get case referrals from the FDA. The agency's statistics reveal an
extraordinarily weak track record for criminal investigations and case
referrals across-the-board. The FDA's Office of Criminal Investiga-
tions reported 196 convictions in prosecutions for all violations of its
statutes in FY 2004; 270 in FY 2005; 279 in FY 2006; 344 in FY
2007; and 369 in FY 2008.92 The FDA Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) executed two seizures in FY 2008 (the
agency does not report how many products or product units were in-
volved) and issued three injunctions.93
As for the objections that future application of the responsible
corporate officer doctrine to food safety cases would do little more
than persecute the well-meaning, potentially driving the worst culprits
underground and discouraging small and mid-size businesses from
coming forward for compliance assistance, two responses are possi-
ble. The enforcement track record in other contexts where the doc-
trine was applied does not substantiate such claims. Second, the FDA
has few alternatives to deterrence-based enforcement in the absence of
massive budget increases that seem very unlikely.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine is admittedly stringent
and, if applied to insignificant or inadvertent violations, might well
strike judges and juries as unfair. However, critics of the doctrine are
hard-pressed to find prominent examples of such abuses in the arena
of environmental law, where it has been vigorously enforced. For
example, during the early years of the Clinton Administration, Profes-
sor Richard Lazarus raised the specter of prosecutions for environ-
90 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Justice
Statistics, Adjudication, May 28, 2009, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm
#Adjudication.
9' Id.
92 Food & Drug Admin., Enforcement Story: Fiscal Year 2008, at 10-18
(2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/Enforcement
Story/default.htm.
93 Id. at 4-31. The agency sells the printed version of the document that
contains these statistics for a whopping $327. See Food & Drug Admin., Product
Details, FDA Enforcement Story, http://www.fdanews.com/store/product/detail
?productld=26366 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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mental crimes that would punish corporate officers who had tried in
good faith to comply with complex, even obscure, regulations. He
argued for changes that would circumscribe the government's discre-
tion under what he saw as unduly vague statutory language. 94 Lois
Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and Natural
Resources Division, and her colleague James Simon, rebutted these
concerns, arguing that the Justice Department operated within a series
of institutional constraints unrecognized by Lazarus and did, in fact,
exercise its discretion wisely, confining prosecution to cases where
conduct was egregious. 95
As for the arguments that strong criminal enforcement will drive
culprits underground while cutting off others from compliance coun-
seling, the most compelling response may well be a pragmatic one.
The utility for agencies like the FDA of robust criminal enforcement
programs grows and intensifies in inverse proportion to their
resources. When funding is plentiful and the number of industry
players is relatively small, agencies can afford to do the individualized
inspections that provide the kind of supportive compliance counseling
envisioned by the GMA's Dooley. Agencies need substantial funding
to field enough inspectors to visit plants frequently, making recom-
mendations to improve compliance, and following up to determine
that those suggestions are implemented. Unless compliance counsel-
ing is carried out in this intensive manner, it is highly unlikely to
work, especially with respect to companies like the peanut producer
PCA that provide ingredients for finished products and therefore do
not risk priceless reputational damage at the retail level. Superficial
counseling efforts, such as sponsoring training conferences for small
and mid-size company employees, are unlikely to promote the pro-
found changes in corporate culture required to jump-start a full-
fledged compliance program.
The days of a simple industry structure and ample inspection staff
are over for the FDA, if they ever existed. The sheer size and com-
plexity of the food industry, which extends not only from farm to ta-
ble but from one side of the world to the other, defeat any realistic
hope of reverting to that kind of cooperative approach. The GMA is
right that the government needs producers to cooperate with its effort
to prevent food-borne illness. It is just as certainly wrong that coop-
94 Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution
of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407
(1995).
9s Lois J. Schiffer & James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting Environ-
mental Criminals: A Response to Professor Lazarus, 83 GEO. L.J. 2531,2532 (1995).
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eration by even the largest, well-meaning companies can fill the
yawning gaps left by the absence of deterrence-based enforcement.
The concern that an aggressive criminal prosecution program will
drive the worst actors underground would be more credible in an in-
dustry comprised primarily of small and mid-sized, independent pro-
ducers who marketed directly to consumers. In contrast, as the PCA
saga demonstrates, large companies like Kellogg and Nestl6 are deep-
ly concerned about the purity of the peanut ingredients they purchased
from PCA. The first multinational, Kellogg may well have made se-
rious errors in setting up its program for requiring third-party audits
allowing PCA to hire and therefore control the firm providing the
inspectors, the American Institute of Baking.96 Kellogg continued to
do business with PCA at its peril. In contrast, Nestl6's inspectors
discovered the grievous conditions at the PCA plant and cut the
company out of its supply chain.97 These episodes show that well-run,
third-party audits, supervised by large producers, could work to
protect the public if their quality was strong enough to result in the
economic isolation of companies like PCA.
III. PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
The gist of the debate between Professor Lazarus and former
Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, regarding the fairness of criminal
prosecution under the federal environmental laws, boiled down to a
fundamental clash over the reliability of prosecutorial discretion as the
palliative that makes charging individual responsible corporate execu-
tives fair or unfair. In that context, the courts have held that under the
responsible corporate officer doctrine, prosecutors need not prove that
a defendant actually knew that certain conduct violated a specific law.
Rather, the prosecution's burden was to prove that defendant, no mat-
ter how high up in the corporate hierarchy, was aware of the offensive
conduct - for example, burying discarded chemicals in an unlined pit
in the ground.9 8 Lazarus argued that because the laws and their im-
plementing regulations are extraordinarily complex, the responsible
corporate officer doctrine. permits prosecution of individual conduct
that might not reflect sufficient culpability because noncompliance
could so easily arise from honest mistake or confusion. Therefore,
Congress should consider amending the law to circumscribe the doc-
trine. Schiffer responded that several external norms, especially the
need to prove one's case to federal judges and juries, gave prosecutors
96 See supra text accompanying notes 12, 50-51.
9 See id.
98 See United States v. Dee, 921 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
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adequate incentives to avoid overreaching and that Lazarus's propos-
als were both unnecessary and unwise. Reviving these arguments
during a period when the FDA is not developing cases against many
people, even for egregious conduct, may seem peculiarly academic, an
unflattering characterization that the author takes quite seriously. But
on the chance that more explicit language restricting abuse of the doc-
trine could overcome the objections of a sufficient number of senators
to obtain the conversion of a misdemeanor into a felony penalty, this
article takes a stab at walking the middle line between the
Lazarus/Schiffer debate.
In 1990, the British Parliament enacted the Food Safety Act,
which imposes criminal penalties for "offences" of up to two years in
jail, a E20,000 fine, and cancellation of a firm's license or registra-
tion.99 "Offence" is defined, inter alia, as "render[ing] any food inju-
rious to health by means of . .. adding any article or substance to the
food."'1' The definition also includes the sale of food that is "inju-
rious to health" or "unfit for human consumption."10' The Act also
applies a version of the responsible corporate officer doctrine: a "di-
rector, manager, secretary or other similar officer," or "any person ...
purporting to act in any such capacity," is liable to the same extent as
the corporation if the violation is committed with the "consent or con-
nivance" of the individual.' 02
To modulate the application of strict liability and give food pro-
cessors an incentive to self-regulate, the British law creates a "due
diligence" defense allowing the accused to prove that she "took all
reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the
commission of the offence."'o3 Consistent with responsible corporate
officer enforcement, these efforts must cover any person under the
control of the defendant.10 4 The law suggests that to prove diligence,
a person could show that commission of the offense was due to an
"act or default" either of a person "not under his control" or done in
"reliance on information supplied by such a person."' 0 5 This provi-
sion could be read to exempt manufacturers such as Kellogg from acts
or omissions of its suppliers, such as PCA. However, this language is
joined by the word "and" with two additional provisos.
9 Food Safety Act, 1990, c. 16, § 35 (Eng.).
100 § 7.
'o' § 8(2).
102 § 36.
103 § 21(1).
'" § 21(3).
'0 § 21(3)(a).
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* The accused carried out all "checks of the food in question
as were reasonable" or that "it was reasonable" for the ac-
cused "to rely on checks carried out by the person who sup-
plied the food to him;" and
* The accused "did not know and had no reason to suspect"
that the "act or omission would amount to an offence." o0
A detailed examination of how the due diligence defense could or
should be implemented is beyond the scope of this article. Four refer-
ence points that flesh out the proposal to adopt it in the United States
should assist readers to make a threshold assessment of its desirabili-
ty.
First and foremost, the defense should not be applicable to the
conduct exemplified by the PCA peanut scandal because that compa-
ny's executives failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure the safety
of the food they processed. Ironically, one of the strongest arguments
in potential defendants' favor, should the PCA criminal case ever go
to trial, is that Georgia state inspectors did not cite the company for its
own mistakes. Yet those mistakes were anything but subtle or hidden.
This anomaly suggests that the due diligence defense should be condi-
tioned on federal "overfilling" authority: that is, favorable state in-
spections should not foreclose initiation of a federal prosecution. This
approach would forestall collusion between underfunded and incom-
petent state inspectors and bad corporate actors.
Both the House and Senate FDA reform bills strengthen the re-
quirement in existing law that food processing facilities register, by
adding requirements that they register annually or biennially, and that
they update their registration within thirty days after any change in
critical information, such as ownership or scope of operation.' 0 7 For-
eign facilities providing food for American consumers are also re-
quired to register.108 Failing to register should constitute a rebuttable
presumption that the facility's owner, operator, or agent cannot meet
the burden of proof under the due diligence defense, with only cases
involving legitimate disputes at the borderline of the new law's defini-
tion of what constitutes a covered facility creating justification for
106 § 21(3)(b)-(c).
107 Compare Food Safety Enhancement Act, H.R. 2749, 111th Cong. § 10 1(b)
(2009) (annual registration), and FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111 th
Cong. § 102 (2009) (requiring biennial registration), with 21 U.S.C. § 350d (2006)
(requiring initial registration only).
'0 H.R. 2749, §§ 204-205 (2009) (registration for commercial importers of
food and customs brokers); S. 510 §§ 301-309 (2009) (foreign supplier verification
program).
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overturning the presumption. This scheme could be set forth in legis-
lative history.
Third, the bills also require the preparation and implementation of
"hazard analysis and risk-based preventive controls" plans and "food
safety plans" by owners, operators, or agents of covered facilities.' 09
Enforcing criminal penalties against companies that prepare plans that
are inadequate or that prepare adequate plans but do not implement
them effectively, will involve more complex deliberations among
prosecutors, regulators, and defense attorneys. Congress should
require the Department of Justice, in consultation with the FDA, to
prepare detailed guidelines on how it will exercise its prosecutorial
discretion. In general, a company that makes a good faith effort to
comply with planning requirements, and that establishes a robust sys-
tem for conducting internal self audits of its plan's procedures, should
be exempt from criminal prosecution.
Fourth, and arguably most important, the Department of Justice
should make it a priority to prosecute violations of safety require-
ments by importers of food products. The abandonment of any effort
to mandate that the FDA employ a FSIS approach to certifying the
efficacy of exporting nations' regulatory systems should come with
the recognition that the only way to protect public health in this coun-
try is to place a far heavier burden on importers to ensure that they
verify minimal safety practices at the food facilities where their prod-
ucts originate.
CONCLUSION
In an era when Congress must move quickly and with determina-
tion to reclaim the efficacy of the FDA's regulatory programs for food
safety, but is unwilling to increase the agency's funding to the point
that traditional inspection programs can coax food producers into
compliance, deterrence-based enforcement is the best alternative for
reform. Criminal penalties must be an integral component of that
approach. Industry fears of the unfair exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion are outweighed by the urgent need resuscitate a safer market-
place. Adopting a due diligence defense modeled on England's food
safety law is a promising way to balance these concerns and impera-
tives.
109 H.R. 2749, § 102; S. 510 § 103 (relating to Hazard Analysis and Risk-
Based Preventive Controls). Both bills leave existing Hazard Analysis Critical Con-
trol Point (HACCP) plan regulations in place.
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